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Juliet FloydParikh and Wittgenstein
A survey of Parikh’s philosophical appropriations of Wittgensteinian
themes, placed into historical context against the backdrop of Turing’s fa-
mous paper [104], “On computable numbers, with an application to the
Entscheidungsproblem” and its connections with Wittgenstein and the foun-
dations of mathematics. Characterizing Parikh’s contributions to the in-
teraction between logic and philosophy at its foundations, we argue that
his work gives the lie to recent presentations of Wittgenstein’s so-called
metaphilosophy (e.g., [38]) as a kind of “dead end” quietism. From early
work on the idea of a feasibility in arithmetic ([54]) and vagueness ([56]) to
his more recent program in social software ([63]), Parikh’s work encompasses
and touches upon many foundational issues in epistemology, philosophy of
logic, philosophy of language, and value theory. But it expresses a unified
philosophical point of view. In his most recent work, questions about public
and private languages, opportunity spaces, strategic voting, non-monotonic
inference and knowledge in literature provide a remarkable series of sugges-
tions about how to present issues of fundamental importance in theoretical
computer science as serious philosophical issues.
Social Software, Wittgenstein, Turing, Parikh, Common Knowledge
1. Introduction
The influence of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy on Rohit Parikh’s work has
been thoroughgoing, quite distinctive, and partly explains the creativity and
breadth of Parikh’s contributions. This essay surveys the long and brilliant
career of his appropriations of Wittgensteinian themes, using this to show
why it is that his biggest notion, that of social software, should be attended
to by mathematicians, philosophers, and computer scientists.
Of course there are many Wittgensteins, just as there are many Peirces,
many Kants, many Platos. The best advice here is to think with a philoso-
pher, rather than primarily about that philosopher; to make as good sense
of as much of the thought as you can, given its context; and to see how the
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best parts might be projected forward in your own thinking. This is what
Parikh has done, aided and abetted by four twentieth century philosophers
from whom he has learned a great deal: W.V. Quine, Burton Dreben, Nel-
son Goodman, and Hilary Putnam.1 For Parikh, in a very distinctive way,
Wittgenstein isn’t the subject matter, he’s the way through.
So in what follows I shall not debate interpretations, so much as try
to say why I think Parikh’s Wittgenstein is worthwhile. The important
point is that he is putting Wittgensteinian insights to use. If philosophy
lives and dies by its applications, then that is a very important thing. In
fact I believe Wittgenstein owes Parikh a big “Thank You”, no matter if
the biographical Wittgenstein would have balked at the appropriation and
development of his ideas under the name Wittgenstein. The real, historical
Wittgenstein, obsessed with controlling his out-of-control vanity, worried
that all his writing and lecturing might do would be to sow the seeds of a
certain jargon, and he feared and hated the humiliation of anyone writing
about him.2 But he did still dare to hope that someone else would draw out
and apply his thinking on the foundations of mathematics.3 That hope has
not been in vain.
From Parikh‘s earliest work on the idea of “feasibility” in arithmetic
([54]), through his work on vagueness ([56, 58, 61]) and on social software
([63, 65]), he has touched on many foundational issues in epistemology, phi-
losophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of language, and value theory.
But his work embodies and develops a unified philosophical point of view,
particularly about what “foundations” really are (and are not). Although
in a broad sense the point of view he has developed belongs in the “finitist”
tradition, it o↵ers a surprising number of undogmatic series of new twists,
reaching horizontally, and not just vertically, and thereby going to the heart
of what we mean by a “foundation”. In general, Parikh has suggested that
we learn how to replace the sort of familiar objections to finitism, and to
Wittgenstein, namely,
But isn’t the statement, concerning a particular system of logistic,
that “there is no contradiction with fewer than 10100 lines” true or
1Strictly speaking, Parikh studied o cially only with Quine and Dreben, for he left
Harvard in 1961 (cf. [60], p. 89). We might also add to the list of philosophers who
have influenced him Peirce and Ramsey. If we did, that might well explain the attraction
Parikh’s work has had for the present author, who was similarly influenced and educated,
at least in part, two generations later on.
2[50], ch. 24.
3[50], ch. 22.
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false? This is not just a question of our “form of life”!4
with questions such as the following—and here I distill the subject matter
of many of Parikh’s papers, without quoting precisely from him:
Can we rigorously formalize aspects of our “form of life”—
including the idea of a “feasible” formalization? In what sense of
“works” is it that we may hope to find a philosophy of mathematics
(and of knowledge) that does “work”? What is knowledge really like?
Parikh thus serves as a counterexample to Paul Horwich’s recent claim in
The New York Times that Wittgenstein’s thought today is ignored by “all
a small and ignored clique of hard-core supporters” [39].5 In fact, given the
interdisciplinary breadth of Parikh’s influence, and his lack of dogmatism,
Parikh shows that Wittgenstein left us something much more important
than a philosophie du jour or a method of exposing nonsense or a great
name to add to a pantheon; rather, he left us open problems and a way of
thinking that is constructive, pointing a way forward.6 Like much philosophy,
Parikh’s lies in a long and developing, if ever-contested tradition. He has
specified a vision of a certain kind. Even if the vision is di↵erent from others,
and may not even look to some like a vision, it is one.
In his most recent work, Parikh is surveying and analyzing questions
about public and private languages, the limits of formalization, opportunity
spaces, elections and social spaces of coordination, knowledge’s e↵ects on
obligations, truthfulness and sincerity, and knowledge in literature—thereby
drawing together game theory, logic, and computer science into a remarkable
series of (rigorously presented) bouquets. Thereby he often shows, quite
critically, how certain ideas that people think go together, ideas that appear
to give us an ultimate foundation (say, of homo economicus, for example,
or our notions of truth and belief and meaning) do not, but are better seen
as “preliminary” analyses ([68], Answer 3), embedded in collections of other
structures and systems, in which the characterization of a total collection is
4[78], p. 511 n. 4.
5In a recent YouTube debate with Timothy Williamson http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=IpOmFTRcwUM), Horwich appealed to problems about logical omniscience to
draw out criticisms of taking quantified modal logic without several grains of salt. It is
unfortunate that he didn‘t take the next step, which would have been to point out the
positive results and work that is going on as a result of those criticisms, rooted in Wittgen-
stein himself. However, this would have contradicted his own reading of Wittgenstein as
having an essentially negative “metaphilosophy”.
6Cf. [9].
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not the point, so much as the study of interactions among them in ordinary
life, which includes the slippages, bendings, and breakings that go on.
Parikh’s mathematical facility—as well as his conviviality and generosity
as a teacher and colleague—have led to a constant stream of interesting and
fruitful putting-togethers and rearrangements of heretofore disparate areas
of logic and the theory of “rationality”: proof theory and bounded arithmetic
([54], [62]), temporal logic and social levels ([63], [66], Bayesian probability
theory and defeasible inference ([1]), epistemic and dynamic epistemic logic
([67], [69]), modal, deontic, and finite information logics ([76]), [67], [53], [3]),
belief revision theory, relevance and topology ([8],[7], [64], [12]), electoral and
political theory ([52], [17]), and even literature and life ([71],[73]). Juxta-
posing these traditions of research with one another by asking philosophical
questions yields interesting accounts of tensions and presuppositions among
them.
Yet Parikh’s papers, while mathematically creative and rigorous, also
provide a remarkable series of suggestions about how to present issues of
fundamental importance in computer science as serious philosophical and
mathematical issues: perhaps most important, ways of thinking that may be
accepted, changed, confronted, or turned, allowing us to rethink and perhaps
change our lives.
It is from this, above all, that emerges the characteristic Wittgensteinian
touch within Parikh’s work: he is able to see philosophical problems where
others see nothing but “rags and dust” (Philosophical Investigations ([116])
(hereafter “PI”) §52). There are only a few of his papers in which Parikh
takes Wittgenstein up as an explicit topic (cf. [59], [75]), and even in these
he is not doing straight exposition, but making a series of points: drawing
connections, working out analogies, testing the limits of other analogies.
Why are the analogies so important? Because analogies always lie at the
basis of any rigorization, and one can fail to see something as philosophi-
cal when it truly is so. One can also mistake a problem in one’s analogical
thinking for a metaphysical literalism, eclipsing the root of the matter. So
the frequent and informed allusions and quotations Parikh often adduces
to Wittgenstein’s remarks should be taken seriously, as part of what he is
doing, and not merely decorative or literary asides. They make a series of
points that economists, philosophers, game theorists and theoretical com-
puter scientists should listen to.
First of all, as Parikh has himself pointed out, logic in the broad sense of
critical reflection on rationality and discourse is an activity, not a particular
Parikh and Wittgenstein 5
standpoint or theory, and in this sense belongs to many traditions.7 (As
Quine and Wittgenstein might have said, each sounding a rather di↵erent
note, logic in the broadest sense is part and parcel of having any view at
all, it is not just one optional point of view.) Yet secondly, and more specif-
ically, Parikh’s work stands in close proximity to a certain quite particular
philosophical tradition of reflection on foundations, stemming not only from
the classical works of Go¨del and Turing in the 1930’s, but also from the
earliest reception of Wittgenstein’s later writings on mathematics. I shall
be emphasizing this stage-setting in what follows, in order to make the case
that there is something philosophical at stake in every paper Parikh writes.
Wittgenstein’s reception began in public space, as a piece of “social soft-
ware”, in 1956, when the first edition of Remarks on the Foundations of
Mathematics ([114], hereafter “RFM”) first appeared. This book was heavily
and posthumously reconstructed by Wittgenstein’s literary executors from
manuscripts never intended for publication, aided and abetted in their ed-
itorial task by Kreisel, an important interlocutor of Wittgenstein’s (and
Parikh’s). (Afterwards Kreisel reviewed the book, calling it “the surpris-
ingly insignificant product of a sparkling mind”, perhaps to cover himself.8)
Dummett ([19]) saw numerous mistakes and errors in RFM, especially in the
remarks on Go¨del.9 (These remarks, su↵ering from a variety of weaknesses,
had been eliminated by Wittgenstein himself from all drafts of the PI that
appeared after 1937.)
Bernays’s somewhat less critical review of RFM [4], though it still ac-
cused Wittgenstein of embracing nihilism and irrationality, did note that
one might see emerging from the scattered remarks a point of view, which
he called “anthropological”. Hao Wang, partly on the basis of conversations
with Go¨del, wrote several papers on this perspective, and associated it with
his own interest in automated theorem proving.10 Nevertheless, at least ini-
tially, Wang was proud of never mentioning Wittgenstein at all (cf. e.g.,
[107]): the brouhaha of enthusiasm for the famed philosopher during this
early period of the 1950s was oppressive, and like Hilary Putnam and John
Rawls, Wang resisted labels, certainly not wanting to become known as a
7See the discussions of Indian sagas in Parikh’s [71].
8See Parikh’s reminiscence of Kreisel in his ([60]).
9For a survey of reactions and a response, see Floyd ([24]).
10[109], p. 214; [107]. As we are now beginning to learn ([29]), Go¨del was thoroughly
immersed in Russell‘s philosophy in 1942-3, and thoroughly involved in combatting what
he took, rightly, to have been the constructivistic e↵ects of Wittgenstein on the second
edition of Principia. Go¨del himself wrote of an “anthropological” sense of truth in his
notebooks, and one may conjecture that although the later Wittgenstein’s writings were
not known to him then, he discussed this idea with Bernays.
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“Wittgensteinian” (cf. my [25]). Parikh, entering the philosophical scene
later on, has felt it important, instead, to develop Wittgenstein’s ideas quite
explicitly, and this under the rubric of “common sense” ([54], p. 494).
Since then, Dummett and others developed the point of view of “strict
finitism” ([20], [118], [119]), and Kripke wrote his famed book on Wittgen-
stein’s rule-following remarks ([42]). These made somewhat more kosher to
the wider philosophical public at least some of Wittgenstein’s writings on
mathematics. But outside of these writers, there has not been a more serious
appropriator of this reading of Wittgenstein’s ideas about logic, foundations,
and mathematics than Parikh. Actually Parikh has done far more than any
of these authors to spread and develop the “anthropologism” associated with
Wittgenstein. For one thing, he is far more sympathetic to the literal use-
fulness of Wittgenstein’s ways of thinking. For another, he has absorbed the
anti-dogmatic side of Wittgenstein more deeply. For a third, his facility as
a proof theorist developed very early, in a very focussed way, building on
Go¨del’s pioneering work on speed up theorems, where tradeo↵s between how
we represent the length of a proof, a “step”, or a symbol are placed front and
center as part of mathematics ([57]). For a fourth, he was immersed at the
early stages in developing proof and complexity theory as part and parcel of
theoretical computer science—a turn anticipated by Wang, but only dimly.
Wang ([109]) took the interaction between Go¨del and Wittgenstein to
have been one of the most important in twentieth century philosophy, but
he sided with Go¨del and Bernays in regarding “anthropologism” as a limited
and partial, though possibly entertainable, point of view. He also attempted,
following Go¨del, to develop a notion of “intuition” of concepts. Parikh, by
contrast, has no use for “intuition” in any classical philosophical sense, but
works with common sense examples in a strategic way, developing “anthro-
pologism” to see just how far it can go. He has shown that it can go very
far. Not of course by contradicting the classical results of Go¨del, without
which Parikh‘s earliest foundational work in proof theory would have been
impossible. But working against this whole approach when it is conceived
of as the only foundational way. Parikh is a kind of conceptual and ethical
pluralist in his very bones, and in this sense a true student, both of Quine
and Putnam, if not also the Buddha. He is also a realist, in Cora Diamond’s
a-metaphysical sense of someone who is realistic about what logic is and can
do ([18]).
Go¨del’s completeness theorem gave us the non-standard models of arith-
metic Parikh would later exploit as engines of semantic development. It also
laid into neat conceptual space the classical consequence relation, on which
so many later results (Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems included) turned.
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Classical first order logic tells how logic would be, if things were simple.11
Parikh urges us to develop logic in the face of the fact that things are not
so simple. Better and more deeply put, Parikh’s work emphasizes that what
counts as “simplicity” is relative to who and where we are, and whom we
are with, and how we incur obligations and draw consequences di↵erently in
the face of particular acts of speaking. This is explicitly a theme, not only
in Plato, but also in the later Wittgenstein.12
Tarski’s analysis of truth for formalized languages not only served the
development of model and set theory, it also allowed philosophers to skirt,
through the schematic approach to structures, head-on confrontation with
the distinction between the infinite and the finite in their syntax for treating
the quantifiers. For Tarski’s schematic, metatheoretic analysis of truth in
formalized languages is neutral with respect to the size of the domain, as
well it should be in connection with the formal aspect of truth in general,
as it serves us in the development of a general notion of definability.
But, as Parikh shows, analogous versions of the old problems keep on
rearing their heads throughout logic. In a sense, even to claim that
From two integers k, l one passes immediately to kl; this process
leads in a few steps to numbers which are far larger than any occurring
in experience, e.g., 67(257
729
).
is in the end “an application of the general method of analogy, consisting
in extending to inaccessible numbers the relations which we can concretely
verify for accessible numbers” as Bernays had said ([54], p. 494). Parikh
showed ([54]) that the analogy could be cashed in di↵erently, that the intu-
itive notions of “feasible” and “reasonable length” are rigorizable, and the
complexity of proofs in that sense may be made mathematically rigorous.
As Buss has said, this work ([54], [55]) was “seminal and influential and led
to large research areas which are still active and fruitful 25 years later” ([5],
p. 43).13 It also showed, philosophically speaking, that the conventional
answer to the question
Does the Bernays number 67(257
729
) actually belong to every set con-
taining 0 and closed under the successor function?
11I owe this way of putting the matter to Colin McClarty, in conversation.
12Cf. PI §§48↵, which allude to Plato’s Theaetetus discussion of whether knowledge can
be reduced to perception. For an explicit connection with Turing, see Parikh and Renero
(forthcoming). As Floyd and Kanamori (forthcoming) show, Go¨del himself discussed the
Theaetetus in his Max Phil notebooks, 1942–3.
13For example, [86].
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—viz., “Yes”—may still be accepted. Nevertheless,
. . . we have seen that there is a very large element of phantasy in con-
ventional mathematics which one may accept if one finds it pleasant,
but which one could equally sensibly (perhaps more sensibly) reject
([54], p. 507).
Going further, into the foundations of logic itself, we are not—individually
or collectively—logically omniscient, either about the logical consequences
of our thoughts or one another’s points of view. We can of course study how
things would be if we were, and develop notions of proposition using either
Frege’s structured thought approach, or the Hintikka-Lewis-Stalnaker idea
of propositions as sets of possible worlds. But, like Wittgenstein, Parikh’s
suggestion is to complicate the logic so as to keep it, and the notion of
“correctness”, applicable, and show how conceptually relative are classical
idealizations.14 This sheds light on what knowledge and logic and truth are,
and not merely on how they might be, if things were simple.
2. Surveyability (U¨bersichtlichkeit)
In looking at Wittgenstein’s RFM, Parikh was struck by how many questions
bearing on fundamentals of theoretical computer science were already being
explored in Wittgenstein’s writings from the 1930’s ([59], p. 92):
I would like to make the case that people in AI who are actually
unaware of much of what Wittgenstein says on this issue are in fact
actually carrying out some of what might have been his program,
namely that if you look at various activities that are going on right
now in Artificial Intelligence and Logics oriented towards it, then
you’ll find that very many of these developed theories can be seen as
expansions of relatively o↵-hand remarks that Wittgenstein makes.
A rather interesting historical fact is that when the RFM first
came out in the early 1950’s, Complexity Theory as we know it
now did not exist. The book was criticized very sharply by Kreisel
([41]). . . It was criticized also by Dummett ([19]), though somewhat
more mildly. Now, whether it was because of this or simply because
the time was not right, RFM was not taken as seriously as the PI
was.
14[54] acknowledges earlier work on the notion of “feasible” by Esenine Volpin ([21]),
but states (p. 494, n.) that Parikh “preferred the more conservative approach of using
‘standard’ methods for [his] technical proofs”.
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If knowing Complexity Theory one goes back and reads the RFM,
then what are impressive are the things that he says which could not
make sense in the 50’s but which make perfect sense now.
There are some historical reasons for this, and they confirm Parikh’s
sense of what is going on. They are important to appreciate philosophically.
For the history shows that Parikh’s questions were always part and parcel
of the classical tradition in logic and foundations, as well as the foundations
of computer science and artificial intelligence, even before they emerged as
separate departments in universities, or separate ventures, and even though
philosophers tended to carve them o↵ from what was called “philosophy”
of “foundations of mathematics” as the twentieth century progressed. The
issues may have been forgotten or overlooked while logicians worked out the
fundamental classical notions of truth, definability, and logical consequence.
But they were always there, entangled with that classical project.
The notion of U¨bersichtlichkeit as a developed philosophical idea in con-
nection with mathematical proof derives from Wittgenstein’s writings of
1939-40, and, significantly, precisely those manuscripts that were written in
the wake of his conversations with Alan Turing in 1937 and 1939 (cf. [24],
[26]). Turing personally sent o↵ only five o↵prints of his famous paper “On
Computable Numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem”
([104]) in the first round, and one was to Wittgenstein, who was then trying
to put together the PI.15 Wittgenstein’s interest in the machine as symboliz-
ing its own action—famously explored in PI §§193-4— probably derives, in
part, from his pondering the relation of Turing’s results to Go¨del’s. What
is clear is that after discussions with Turing the notion of U¨bersichtlichkeit
springs to the fore of his thinking about the nature of logic and proof in math-
ematics, and is brought to bear in his criticisms of the idea that Principia
Mathematica can serve as a “foundation” of arithmetic in logic. Wittgen-
stein also became interested in the context- bound status of the distinction
between the notions of proof, calculation, and experiment after discussions
with Turing.16
15Turing to his mother February 11, 1947, from Princeton (AMT/K/1/54, at the King’s
College archives (http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=414&title=54)).
16Contrary to what many have assumed, Wittgenstein did not read Turing’s famous
paper on the “Turing Test” for intelligence ([106]), at least until the very end of his life,
when there is no evidence of its having influenced him. This is shown by his letter to
Malcolm of January 12, 1950, where he tells Malcolm he has not read it, but states, “I
imagine it is no leg pull” ([47] pp. 129–30, also in Wittgenstein ([115])). Wittgenstein
did discuss the question, “Can a machine think?” as early as 1926 with Schlick. This
was because Russell asked the question already in his ([84]) Lecture XIII, “On Truth
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In RFM Wittgenstein appears to o↵er a version of the Poincare´ objec-
tion to logicism: because formal Principia proofs and terms are not always
surveyable, we need to use mathematical induction in setting out the very
formulae of the system, thereby helping ourselves to arithmetic and counting
already at the outset, in trying to “take in” a formal proof.17 In working
through a proof, for example, we may need to index and count the variables,
draw lines in the margins connecting parts with one another, and so on. But
if these pieces of “software” are necessary for us to take in the proof, then
they are no less working parts of the proof than the formalism, and then
there is no true “reduction” of arithmetic to logic. Instead we are using
mathematics to make things “surveyable” or u¨bersichtlich, just as Hilbert
would have said we must.
The di culty with this objection, of course, is not to have it bring in
irrelevancies of psychology into discussions of the foundations of logic and
mathematics.18 Frege and Russell aimed to extrude psychology altogether
from their respective conceptions of justification, and Wittgenstein followed
them here. Justifications do not reduce to strikings, experiences, acts of
acquaintance, or seemings: we cannot experience in that way the “because”
(PI §176). Nevertheless, if mathematics itself is necessary for us to take logic
in, then it is arguably a matter of logic, and not merely psychology, that “a
proof must be surveyable” (u¨bersichtlich, u¨bersehbar, u¨berblickbar) (RFM III
§§1,21-2,39,55; IV §41).
The word “U¨bersicht” is di cult to translate; some readers like the term
“perspicuous” or “open to view”, or “surview”, but this can imply that one
has achieved a kind of mountain-top angle on things, and is able to take
in all details in a glance, and understand the place of all of them within
a larger whole. This is not Wittgenstein’s meaning, and as has been ar-
gued by Mu¨hlho¨lzer [51], a better translation would be “surveyable”. When
Wittgenstein writes that one of his methods in philosophy is to present us
with u¨bersichtliche Darstellungen, or “surveyable representations” of gram-
mar, he means that he is providing snapshots of portions of human linguistic
activity designed to let us work through them usefully, to survey them in that
sense. What matters is, first of all, that the proof can be easily reproduced
or copied, “in the manner of a picture”: a proof must be communicable,
and Falsehood”, arguing that while there is no di culty in attributing to a machine
“correctness” of response, the issue of truth is more complex.
17Parikh ([54], p. 502) already interprets the objection in terms of what is called there
an “anthropomorphic system” of bounded arithmetic, in which the notion of “feasibility”
is rigorized.
18On this see Goldfarb ([37]), Stenlund ([93]).
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easily reidentifiable, recognizable, as this proof and not another, it must not
be an experiment each time it is ventured, but rather it must serve as a kind
of calculation in the sense that it entangles us with what has to come out, if
the procedure is correctly followed (cf. RFM I §§1,22,39,55). Thus what also
matters, second, is that a proof is a proof without something (some thing)
behind it: it shows itself as a proof, no one general foundational theory of it
being needed.
Let us generalize this idea of U¨bersichtlichkeit. The saying “I only know
my way about like a rat in a maze” voices an idea Parikh has elaborated
for many years: the rat may well know the right cues about when to turn
left or right, but lack an overview or map of the situation—anyway, a map
that she can use to see how to read other maps, using maps as members of
a category. Deferring a fuller discussion of animal consciousness as such to
§4 below, let us consider ourselves, as human beings with our widely shared
capabilities. As a human with faculties and experience enough, I can easily
memorize one or two station changes on the Boston MBTA transportation
line. But holding in mind the whole, so as to make creative or novel choices,
requires a model or structure that I am capable of projecting in a variety
of ways. Fortunately, o cials provide posters of the surview in all stations,
and make it available on the web, and the map is comprehensive enough to
do the job. In this regard, more than its accuracy, we should emphasize the
map’s usefulness in being the sort of representation that can be taken in in
just a few seconds, followed and discussed by most of us (including those
who may not speak very fluent English), easily posted on the wall of a train
car, and used. In a sense, its truthfulness is its loyalty, loyalty being the
originally root meaning of the word “true”, at least in English.
Parikh substitutes “truthfulness” for “truth” in many of his writings,
and this is no accident. He is suggesting that truth is a matter of degree,
insofar, at least, as we know and act on it. Peirce, for one, seems to have
thought of a true belief, not necessarily as an ideal limit point, i.e., a fixed
ideal belief that scientists would agree about in the ultimate long run, but,
rather, a tenacious and loyal one that will not let us down.19 Generally
19Read this way, as Cheryl Misak does ([49]), Peirce does not fall into the errors at-
tributed to him by Quine at the end of Chapter 1 of Word and Object, where Quine
complains about the unclarity of “ideal truth in the long run” as a definition of truth
([82], §6). Parikh’s work with San Gine´s (manuscript) explores the relevance of a prag-
matic approach to belief, augmented by a 3-dimensional approach analyzing the “success”
of a belief into its relativity to the (first person) thinker, the situation of a co-participant
(second person) as their joint activities unfold over time, and the (third person) unfolding
of circumstances themselves over time.
12 Juliet Floyd
speaking, the MBTA map does not let us down and we expect it not to.
It works, and in this sense serves as an U¨bersicht, i.e., as a guide to action
and communication, not merely a piece of information. Or, perhaps better,
insofar as it codifies things to be known, it is sensitive to understandings
and perceived and expected needs among us.20 Could this “usefulness” break
down? Of course. New lines may be built, and it becomes outdated; the
map could be systematically misprojected by a group, Martians could land
who couldn’t understand it. But it is not the job of a piece of social software
to take into account all possibilities. Nor even to justify us su cient unto
the day we act. Instead, the map opens up a space of possible actions: it is
analogous to an operating system, within which we make choices.
Parikh is not suggesting that we reduce “knowing that” to “knowing
how” in any facile way. More deeply, he is after what the knowing of “know-
ing that” really amounts to, if it is logically structured. The MBTA map is
a representation, surely, a piece of information, perhaps a paradigmatic one.
We may not wish to honor it with the title of “depiction”, if by depiction
we mean something like a portrait, in which we may see, not only the Mona
Lisa, but Lisa herself. Or perhaps it is a “depiction” in a very malleable
sense of a “symbol”, but then it may not be considered a very good one,
except in a school of graphic design.
The important point here is that there is a broader point of view, both
on a depictive portrait and on the MBTA map: both are also, as Parikh has
called them since his originating works ([63],[65]), pieces of social software.
The map of the MBTA helps us bear in mind more easily a great deal of
action-points, as individuals. The portrait of Lisa tells us something, not
only about her, but about the artist, the time and manner in which she
lived, and her person. That is why it can serve as a touchstone for each of
us, gazing upon it: it is a gesture of Leonardo’s—which is why it matters
whether he painted two Mona Lisa portraits, and not just one.21 The social
aspect opens up for us humans the possibility of all kinds of collective action:
communication, teaching, learning, and, generally, the enlargement of spaces
of opportunities for knowing, believing, and acting—things we do, after all,
in concert with one another, not merely to one another.
It is in these “social software” respects that the rat’s powers to articulate,
advise its fellows, generalize, and create new opportunities for all of the above
is quite limited in comparison with our own. This is shown everywhere in our
20On context sensitivity and understandings, see Travis ([98], [99], [100]).
21Cf.http://www.pbs.org/wnet/secrets/mona-lisa-mystery-full-episode/1821/and
http://www.openculture.com/2013/12/first-mona-lisa.html.
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daily lives. Shopping for an apple in a grocery store—to choose a canonical
example from Wittgenstein’s PI §2 that has been discussed in detail by
Parikh, emphasizing the importance of parameters and protocols ([70])—
or, to take some other examples, recounting a story of why someone in the
o ce is angry, or “liking” on the web, or voting, or calling 911: all of these
activities are embedded within and by means of social forms of infrastructure
that we mostly do not bring to mind as forms of social software when we
act within them. Of course we do not: their function is, after all, to o✏oad
the problem of actually reaching decisions to something else, just like the
MBTA map. That o✏oading can then itself be represented as a piece of
social software, and that representation in turn again regarded as part of
what we do, hence part of social software as well.
The idea of taking this notion of U¨bersichtlichkeit, or “surveyability”, in
at the foundational level is this. The notion is nearly as comprehensive as
that of computability a` la Turing, if not more so, since we don’t calculate with
all of our concepts, but only with special ones, whereas concepts as such are
meant for sharing and use in a social setting in which we act, communicate,
articulate, express, influence, grow and jointly engage with one another.
Parikh has recently asked, somewhat tongue in cheek, whether there
might not be a Church’s Thesis for social algorithms ([73]). That would
place what Turing accomplished into a new light—without, I suppose, con-
tradicting his analysis. The point would be, as Parikh says ([59], p. 89-90),
a fourfold, Wittgensteinian one:
• Mathematics as an Applied Science: The truth of Mathematics is
that it fits into our lives.
• The Importance of the Social: Language as also Mathematics and
even thinking—certainly we think of the last as a private process—are
in fact, according to [Wittgenstein], social activities.
• Locality or Context Dependence: We do not have general notions
like knowledge, truth, number but context dependent ones.
• Flexibility: A formal system does not fully determine our behaviour
nor how we use it.
3. Turing Machines: From Language Games to Social Soft-
ware
Let us return to Turing, to whom we owe the idea, if not in some respects
the fact, of the stored program computer, via what Church would call his
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notion of a “Turing Machine”. Wittgenstein and social software—hence
philosophy—may be seen, in retrospect, to have been entangled with Tur-
ing’s model, just as Parikh has been arguing.
Many philosophers since the early 1960s have thought that logical anal-
ysis gave us great insight into the individual: states of mind, cognitive pro-
cesses and their computational modeling of cognitive states, and so on. Com-
putational Functionalism— invented in part by Putnam, but later rejected
by him—dominated the approach to cognitive content for a very long time.
But “Can Machines Think?” was imagined by Turing in his ([104] §8) explic-
itly as nothing more (and nothing less) than a comparison between a human
computer—an individual—and a machine: as what Wittgenstein would have
called a language-game, i.e., ultimately, an analogy. Turing’s proofs do not
depend upon their serving as descriptions of what actually goes on in our
minds, ultimately, when we calculate, any more than Wittgenstein’s imag-
ined language-games are intended to describe everything that happens when
we use language. They could not, after all, if he was to resolve the Entschei-
dungsproblem, for no mathematical theorem can turn on a thesis in the
philosophy of mind.
Turing signaled this in §1 of his famed [104] by stating that “we may
compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine
which is only capable of a finite number of conditions” (my italics). A
language game is not exactly a description of what we do, it is instead a
comparison, as Wittgenstein says (PI §130):
Our clear and simple language-games are not preliminary stud-
ies for a future regimentation of language, as it were, first approxi-
mations, ignoring friction and air resistance. Rather, the language-
games stand there as objects of comparison which, through similari-
ties and dissimilarities, are meant to throw light on relations of our
language.
In other words, the idea of a “language game” is intended by Wittgenstein
to speak to questions concerning our very idea of what logic is, rather than
specifically to matters of psychology. As Parikh has written ([70]), Wittgen-
stein is using language games to stress the importance of social software,
protocols, and partial renditions of games in logic.
Turing begins §1 of his [104] this way:
We have said that the computable [real] numbers are those whose
decimals are calculable by finite means. This requires rather more
explicit definition. No real attempt will be made to justify the defi-
nitions given until we reach §9. For the present I shall only say that
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the justification lies in the fact that the human memory is necessarily
limited.
There has been a lot of discussion in the literature of this remark about
human memory. Many have assumed that Turing must have been committed
to a very particular theory of human mentality, and used this theory of mind
to achieve his result.22 In particular, the thought is that he was reducing
consciousness to merely bodily or physical processes, limited in space and
time, and construing a human thinker as really nothing more than a machine.
It is true that throughout his paper Turing speaks of the finite number of
“states of mind” of a human computer, and the ability of a human to take in
only a small number of figures “at a glance” ([104], §9). It sounds as if Turing
is making a series of epistemological points, directly continuing the Hilbert
finitistic or formalistic tradition, or perhaps broaching a behavioristic theory
of cognition and/or perception.23 This invited the idea of a “language of
thought” operating automatically inside the head, as if philosophy of mind
and/or our perceptual ability to cognize were central or foundational to
his model. This in turn lead to the rather irrelevant criticism that in his
modeling of the classical consequence relation by way of an infinite tape
Turing was analyzing thought in a way useful only for Martians or cognitive
scientists.
However, Turing himself was more careful. In fact this opening remark
constitutes no theory of mind at all, in the sense that a traditional meta-
physics is intended to o↵er. The response to Hilbert is a response, but also
a reorienting of the whole subject back to us, to scrutinize the nature of the
conditions involved in resolving the Entscheidungsproblem. What Turing
does, right at the beginning, is to simply reiterate the point of e↵ectiveness
in the context of mathematics, and therefore, in human life. He is calling
attention to what is “right before our eyes”.
Turing could not have proved a mathematical result based on any theory
of mind, however powerful: mathematical theorems about mathematics can-
not be based on theories of minds, but only on mathematics. Instead, in the
spirit of Wittgenstein’s idea of routines that are “plain to view”, I suggest
we take Turing to be remarking on what is, in the end, a rather obvious
point. He is making the whole idea of an “e↵ective calculation”, hence the
whole idea of a “formal system”, plain.
The general idea of a Turing Machine boils down the idea of a “step-
by-step” routine to its simplest, most intuitive elements, those derived from
22See [36]. For criticisms of Go¨del’s assumptions see [110], [90].
23Cf. [89].
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what we human beings do. The tape is unbounded (“infinite”) in length:
one can always add on to each routine another, then another, and so on
(Turing points out that the linearization into a 2-dimensional tape is only
one possibility, used for his purposes). Moreover the “paper”, or “tape”
contains “squares” to be marked with “symbols”, and it does not matter
which particular symbols they are: algorithms can be communicated by
means of a whole variety of methods, languages, diagrams, pictures, and so
on. The (human) computer is held to a) “see” only a bounded collection of
symbols at each single step, “at a glance”— shades of U¨bersichtlichkeit—and
b) only to have written down, at any specific point in the process, a finite
number of symbols that it can move to locally.24 As Turing says explicitly
([104], §9, III),
It is always possible for the computer to break o↵ from his work,
to go away and forget all about it, and later to come back and go on
with it. If he does this he must leave a note of instructions (written
in some standard form) explaining how the work is to be continued.
This note is the counterpart of the “state of mind”.
This “counterpart”, is a shareable command: part of the general interface
environment. It forms part of our most ordinary sense of a routine that
o✏oads, to save e↵ort, for human beings—as individuals, and within groups.
There is no “there” there, if we ask “Where is the interface?”
The most comprehensive perspective we have of what Turing modeled is,
then, that of social software. In [104] Turing showed, step by step, how his
machines could carry out any e↵ective calculation that the Go¨del and Church
systems could carry out— and, by imaginative extension, any one we might
dream up, thereby fixing a very widely-applicable parameter for titrating
the notion of a “step” in a computation. That this parameter is provably
robust, impervious to the vagaries of particular formal languages or local
conventions of symbolism, struck Go¨del as nothing short of a “miracle”, once
and for all determining the precise generality of his incompleteness results.25
24Wilfried Sieg ([91]) has “axiomatized” Turing’s model with these “boundedness” and
“locality” conditions, showing that nothing in what Turing did refutes Hilbert’s approach.
One might however say that Turing encompasses that approach as but one among oth-
ers in mathematics and philosophy. Wittgenstein himself makes very few remarks on the
axiomatic method, although there is nothing in his approach, per se, that refutes its impor-
tance for tagging assumptions in deductive reasoning contexts, and in fact the axiomatic
method may be said to fit nicely with the view of mathematical sentences as norms or
commands (cf. Friederich [30]).
25See [35], p. 1.
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Turing, he said, had gotten to “the right perspective” mathematically.26
Go¨del objected, however, to what he took to be a prejudicial assumption
of Turing’s about our mental lives: that our experiences are discrete or
discretizeable.
However, philosophically what needs to be stressed is that a Turing ma-
chine, as a construct, is double-faced: from one point of view, it is nothing
but just another formal system. But from another point of view, it tells
us what a formal system is, by showing us what it is for. To resolve the
question what a formal system (or “e↵ective calculation”) is, it did no good
to write down another formal system (or perform another computation). It
also would have done no good to have furthered a theory of mind, if Turing
had done so. Instead, one had to do something, to make the question clear.
Turing of course also showed that since any Turing machine’s recipe of
directions, configurations, and symbols can itself be coded by numbers and
thereby worked on by another, there is a universal Turing machine that can
carry out the routine of any and every machine. It is this, as Martin Davis
has argued, that leads to our sense of the “ubiquity” of computable processes
in our world.27 There is no diagonal “escape” from the class of e↵ective
computations by means of anything e↵ectively computable, for the universal
computer can always incorporate any e↵ectively computable process into
itself.
As Davis has also emphasized, Turing’s model shows us that a distinc-
tion that may be—and was—naturally drawn by early computer designers
between software, hardware, and data is not rigid, but rather contextual and
shifting.28 This is the essential insight behind the idea of the stored program
computer: a single device, as we all know nowadays, can perform multiple
tasks, as we open up di↵erent routines, or programs, and it can work on its
own program and activities as well, for example joining in in the activities
with other machines and users.29
One might add something else, drawing out a philosophical implication
that is also a supposition: the distinction between what I and we do and
what the machine does is fluid in life, within the interface. This suggests
that what it is to perform a calculation (correctly or incorrectly) is itself
an occasion-sensitive matter; an agent-relative matter sometimes, a matter
of social purpose at other times, a matter of particular collectivities within
multi-agent systems at others. Our standards of correctness are norms,
26Go¨del to Wang, in Wang ([108]), p. 85; Copeland ([11]), pp. 45,48, ([10]), ch. 2.
27Davis ([16]).
28See Davis’s [14],[15], [16].
29See Copeland’s [10].
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like commands, and their standards of fulfillment are brought together with
language in ways that involve much plasticity, as well as structure.
In the initial philosophical reception of Turing’s ideas, however, the com-
munity, the environment, the social setting, and the culture, were shoved
o↵stage. This was a sign of the times: philosophers wanted to bring psy-
chology back into the fold of their thinking. Even Paul Grice, whose notion
of “conversational implicature” has been an important stimulus for Parikh’s
work ([65], [66]), remained in thrall to a certain picture of correctness based
on the notion of “intention” conceived of as a psychological state. And in
this Grice continues to be followed by many philosophers of a naturalistic
bent, as well as researchers in Artificial Intelligence who believe that we are
Turing Machines all the way down.
In his later essays, however, Turing himself was quite clear that a so-
cial context would be required for the development of his ideas. His 1948
technical report “Intelligent Machinery: A Report by A.M. Turing” contains
the observation that “an isolated [human] does not develop any intellectual
power” ([103]), and he emphasized the need for creativity and intuition, as
well as rule-following. In fact, as has been argued ([95]; [96]), his vision of
computing machinery presupposed that frequent communication and con-
tact among human beings would be crucial for developing human cognitive
abilities.
Only with the development of the web’s architecture, the ubiquity of
analysis of our communications and the crowd-sourcing of intellectual projects
has the obviousness of the point risen to philosophical consciousness clearly.
Early on, logic and philosophy were too much in thrall to the idea that, as
Russell put it in his William James Lectures of 1940 [85] (ch. XIII), “‘cor-
rect’ cannot be used in defining ‘true’, since ‘correct’ is a social concept, but
‘true’ is not”.
For Parikh, however, it was always and only about the system, about
the interplay between truth and correctness, the individual and society, and
never about the individual’s state of mind or truth as such independent
of the opportunity spaces we inhabit.30 Somehow—perhaps because of his
upbringing in India, perhaps because of study with Quine, Goodman and
Putnam and others in the philosophy department at Harvard— Parikh made
it a point to pursue culture and society as, so to speak, foundational in the
development of logic. He never fell for functionalism, but instead kept Tur-
30Lately Parikh has absorbed the importance of Amartya Sen’s thinking about justice
as a notion rooted in capabilities and opportunities, rather than abstract principles of
opportunity.
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ing’s analysis of computability in mind as a designed device, an analogy, as
Wittgenstein would have always suggested that it was, and as Turing him-
self said. Already in his early work on bounded arithmetic [54], Parikh was
turning away from the classical consequence relation and placing epistemic
limitations on it, working with notions such as “feasibility” in arithmetic
and in vagueness ([56], [58]). He took Turing, quite correctly, to have come
up with something that itself was only an “analogy” in analyzing the notion
of “e↵ective calculability”.
There are two final historical sides about Wittgenstein and Turing that
are relevant.
1. Action and Turing’s Argument. The importance to Turing’s analy-
sis of what it is that we do with rules is very clear when we examine the
particular argument by means of which Turing resolved Hilbert’s Entschei-
dungsproblem in his [104], showing that there can be no general way of
e↵ectively determining whether or not a given sentence of a language does
or does not follow from another.31 He did so, not by producing a contra-
diction, as is usual in presentations of the proof nowadays via the Halting
argument, but instead by showing how, if one assumes that there is a de-
cision procedure of this general kind, one would then be committed to the
constructability of a tautological machine, one that could be made to do
something like turning up a card in a game that says “Do whatever it is that
you are doing”. This would be an empty command that cannot be followed,
though it can be defined. There can be no such machine, and so no such
general procedure.32
The argument is a kind of “diagonal” argument, but one that works by
reduction to tautology, rather than to contradiction. It bears an analogy to
the truth teller paradox (“This sentence is true”), but with an important
di↵erence: the focus on action and correctness, the possibility of being able
to carry out or follow the command, is clearer. What Turing wrote is that the
more straightforward approach, via a general use of negation in a diagonal
argument, may, he says , “leave the reader with a feeling that ‘there must be
something wrong’” (§8). That person might have been, e.g., an intuitionist—
31Or, “what is the same thing” ([104] §11), how to e↵ectively determine in general
whether when one adjoins a new axiom in the series of theories Go¨del ([34]) showed us
how to generate, one ends up with a consistent theory.
32The negation of this rule, namely, “Do whatever you are not doing” could also be
defined; yet in the context of Turing’s argument in his [104], this would equally well be
a command that could not really be followed, for the problem would remain of how to
specify what it is that you are doing at that particular step, such that you are not to do
it.
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it may even have been the historical Wittgenstein. Be that as it may, in
Turing’s situation, he did not want to get into the problem of negation,
whether or not the “law of contradiction” is a universal law. So instead he
artfully dodges foundational controversy, something Bernays suggested he
flag explicitly in the revisions to [104] that he got Turing to publish right
away.33 He defines a “rule” that cannot be followed, communicated in the
service of action, or worked with. What he is showing is that the idea of that
goes outside the game of e↵ective calculability, as we understand it humanly
in the Hilbertian context.
As I have shown ([26]), Wittgenstein knew Turing’s [104] tautological
diagonal argument quite well. Well enough that in 1947, recalling that
argument apparently by heart, he remarked in a notebook ([117], §1096):
Turing’s “‘Machines’. These machines are humans who calculate.
And one might express what he says also in the form of games. And
the interesting games would be such as brought one via certain rules
to nonsensical instructions. I am thinking of games like the “racing
game”. One has received the order ”Go on in the same way” when
this makes no sense, say because one has got into a circle. For that
order makes sense only in certain positions.34
2. Turing derived his notion of types from Wittgenstein. In his [105]
paper “The Reform of Mathematical Notation and Phraseology” Turing ex-
plicitly acknowledged Wittgenstein’s Cambridge 1939 lectures on the foun-
dations of mathematics [LFM], stating that they inspired his approach to
data types. This approach is earmarked by its attention to what Turing
calls the language of “the mathematician in the street”, ordinary language,
which is conceived of as given to us already typed (cf. my [28] for an intro-
duction to Turing’s paper). The point of Turing’s paper was to take stock of
the fact that mathematical logic is “an alarming mouthful” for the average
mathematician, so that it would be desirable to design logic in such a way
that none of the classical formalisms would even be necessary to learn. The
method proposed was to go through textbooks of ordinary mathematics, to
see what words mathematicians actually use, and build logic from there.
33See Turing’s [102], discussed in Floyd’s [26]. Bernays urged, in a suggested revision
to Turing’s association of machines with real numbers, that Turing make explicit that a
Brouwerian fan construction could be used.
34Wittgenstein’s remarks date from 1947. We do not know precisely which “racing
game” Wittgenstein had in mind, but at Blackpool and other amusement parks there
were mechanical games with this name played in pinball parlors, and there were board
games as well.
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So Parikh was also on firm historico-philosophical ground in stating ([65],
p. 187) that Wittgenstein “introduced” the notion of a data type with his
notion of a language-game.
4. Animal Cognition
The “form of life” that is human forms its life ubiquitously with social soft-
ware. The reason Parikh’s notion is philosophical is that it runs this wide and
this deep. Even deeper still, however: when one adopts a Wittgensteinian
“snapshot” perspective, thinking methodologically by means of “language-
games”—partial, truncated descriptions of a portion of human linguistic
activity—then comparisons with animal behavior come to seem, for certain
games, as important as anything else. In §§2-5 of PI, elaborating on his
language-game 2 (“block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”) Wittgenstein uses the
terms “rufen” (to call) and “abrichten” (to train), both of which apply to
animals as naturally as to humans. To say—as we ordinarily and naturally
do—that “the cock calls [ruft] the hens by crowing” already involves us in “a
comparison with our own language” (§493). As Wittgenstein writes (§494),
I want to say: it is above all the apparatus of our ordinary lan-
guage, of our word-language, that we call “language”; and then other
things by analogy or comparability with it.
Social software—and much of Parikh’s work in proof theory—similarly works
by way of analogies, carefully chosen to suggest novel ways of re-designing
our logic. A certain degree of cooperation and communication and signaling
of feeling, hope, disappointment and happiness are surely part of what we
hold in common with animals—perhaps especially dogs and horses, more
than cats or rats or fish (Parikh, born a Jain and now a Buddhist, is an
admirably thoroughgoing and inspiring vegetarian). It is not necessary for
a “belief” to be linguistically articulated, as Russell and Ramsey and Quine
all held: watching the behavior of an animal, placing a bet, observing, are
enough for belief-attribution to get going, and Parikh has modeled these
forms of belief ([69]). Of course, one may say with justification that specific
directives, of an articulated propositional sort, carrying forth to far-flung,
nearly unlimited regions of discourse about discourse and about cooperation
and its role in discourse and hence in philosophies: these are not part of what
fish or rats or dogs have yet evolved to. They lack social software of these
kinds. They lack logic and mathematics. We lack knowing our ways about
with them in certain contexts in which we feel more at home with humans,
as they have lacks with us. Yet we do feel for and with them, and there are
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times when they may even out-do us in poignancy and appropriateness of
response, anticipation, and instinct. Social software, used as a model, tells
us about belief, including animal belief, because what beliefs are depends in
part on our resources in representing them.
This is the spirit in which Wittgenstein wrote in PI Part II (PPF) that
(xi, §327) “if a lion could talk, we couldn’t understand him” (used as an
epigraph to Parikh and Ramanujam’s [74]), or, perhaps better put (Part II
(PPF) i §1):
One can imagine an animal angry, fearful, sad, joyful, startled.
But hopeful? And why not?
A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe
that his master will come the day after tomorrow? —And what can
he not do here? — How do I do it? —What answer am I supposed
to give to this?
Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered
the use of a language. That is to say, the manifestations of hope are
modifications of this complicated form of life. (If a concept points
to a characteristic of human handwriting, it has no application to
beings that do not write.)
The point here is not to deny that a dog can expect or hope for the
return of a human master (or be disappointed, angry, jealous, and so on), or
to say, with Davidson ([13]), that animals do not have beliefs at all. Instead,
it is to insist that our concept(s) of hope are embedded in highly ramified
and articulated forms of interlocking systems of parametrization.
This helps to clarify some of the ways in which Davidson may be thought
of as having been correct about animals, and some of the ways he may be
considered to have been wrong. We, unlike the dog, can hope for someone’s
arrival the day after tomorrow, can therefore be hoping for someone’s arrival
day the after tomorrow or the next day, can hope for all kinds of situations
we can write down in sentences; can be wrong (and disappointed and frus-
trated) in all kinds of ways a dog cannot be. What we have in addition to
(beside? over?) the dog is connected with our evolved powers of language,
including, for example, the fact that we can and do write to one another to
set appointments, express hopes, fears, expectations, and so on. We have
what one might call a “knowledge” based semantics of messages, as Parikh
and Ramanujam have argued ([74]).
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This implies that the reach of our power of grasping negation, in the
classical sense, is an important benchmark.35 While the distinction (and
relation(s)) between that power and our powers of direct perception com-
prise disputed philosophical territory, in which we may coin new terms for
half- or part-way representations (cf. Millikan’s [48] on “Popperian” animals,
Travis’s [101] on “Pyrrhonian attitudes”), the important point all these pow-
ers comprise, in Parikh’s view, elements of social software. Animals surely
share some of this with us. Not all of it. This is not a principled argu-
ment about rights, or good and bad. It is instead an ordinary observation,
if we let what is right before us in ordinary life shine through as something
important, awaiting modeling.
We, unlike the dog, face a question whether and to what extent proposi-
tionhood (propositional structuring) is real. If, with Quine, one rejects the
idea of an ether-like absolute framework of propositions, or works without
the full the idea of propositions as sets of possible worlds, there remains the
question of how we are to see these notions at work in our talk and action.
Our resistance to making full propositional attitude attributions to animals
ought to get us to ask an important question: since we too are animals, isn’t
there a large degree of imagined “phantasy” ([54], p. 507) surrounding the
very idea of a proposition as it has been articulated from Frege onwards?
If that notion is precise, then are what we do and say vague? Is vagueness
the wrong way to talk about our notion of something specific that is said
on a particular occasion? What are the tradeo↵s in di↵erent approaches to
meaning and belief?
5. Rationality
It is an implication of Parikh’s analogy between what we do and software
systems that propositional utterances, true or false, are not the only sorts of
moves we make in a language-game another Wittgensteinian point (cf. PI
§23). In fact Parikh wants to work, as Wittgenstein did not, with questions
about why people act in the ways that they do, rather than simply model
knowledge and justification. This, the province of a Ramseyian approach
35Wittgenstein registers this Fregean, Russellian point in many places, perhaps most
interestingly in RFM I Appendix III §4, in his earliest remarks on Go¨del’s incompleteness
result, when he mentions our making gestures to stop a dog acting in a certain way. Here
he is not so much attempting to refute Go¨del, as to understand how the result bears on
our notion of truth (cf. my [23]). It is no accident that the language-games at the opening
of PI lack negation: part of Wittgenstein’s point is to register the importance of negation
to our notion(s) of thought.
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to belief, entangles Parikh with incentive-representations, and how it is that
obligations emerge.
Parikh’s notion of social software is not something exhausted by the
ordinary analysis of rationality as self-interest that has traditionally taken
place in game theory. On the contrary: it is game theory’s usefulness in
modeling certain aspects of market and other transactional human behavior
that needs explaining, from his point of view. Game theory is, to repeat,
only a “preliminary” step, so far as he is concerned.
First of all, game theory is able to represent only a portion of who we
are, as humans. Second, game theory was long plagued by too narrow a
Hobbesian focus on individual self-interest, and too underdeveloped a sense
of language as a kind of stipulative convention, rather than treating language
itself, and what we do with and in it, as part and parcel of the structure
within which incentives and normative elements actually arise. Finally, game
theorists—as Kahneman, Tversky and Aumann and others have shown—
for a long time retained the eggshells of game theory’s birth from classical
modern logic: it did not systematically confront problems of how deontic
obligations are actually generated on the basis of beliefs; it customarily
assumed infinitary common knowledge; and in general it suppressed the
significance of limited and partial knowledge in real life. There are so many
other games we play, so much else we in fact do, that may be subjected to
rigorous structural representation, and thereby the generation of designed
U¨bersichtlichkeit or surveyability in logic.
Many philosophers interested in the notion of convention have been in-
fluenced by David Lewis ([43]), who elaborated our interactions with one an-
other as “score-keeping” devices at work in what Lewis, following Wittgen-
stein, called “language-games” [45]. But Lewis, interested in the causal
unfolding of language’s evolution, was not stressing the social and logical
structure of logical structuring itself, even if he did bring out numerous
ways in which presuppositions a↵ect reasoning. Instead, he was, like the
game theorist, thinking of the evolution as a process of coordination, as in
the rowing of a boat by two persons, each commanding her own oar sepa-
rately. He was a realist as a metaphysician. But in a real sense, he remained
in the Hobbesian fold, with possible world semantics used as a way to make
sense of truth via a general metaphysics of propositions. From this he drew
many philosophical implications; among them, for example, that (on pain of
triviality) probability conditionals are uninterpretable as propositions ([44]).
In the end, like Quine, though from a di↵erent perspective, Lewis ended
by regarding our notion of knowledge as “elusive”, perhaps as elusive as an
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indexical like “big”: a matter of degree.36
Lewis’s approach has evoked responses from other philosophers, such as
Margaret Gilbert ([32], [33]), who defend the important notion of a “social”
or “institutional” fact, something real held in common among us. John
Searle ([88]) elaborated this idea more recently by means of an extension of
Austin’s speech act theory, and a realistic theory of social ontology. And yet:
this dialectic between a conception of individuals coordinating through self-
interest and a competing conception of individuals sharing common goods
and common knowledge, while it unfolds an ontological controversy, requires
proof theory and logic for its resolution: the subjection of the structuring of
possible systems to detailed mathematical investigation.
Part of Parikh’s alternative approach has been to rigorize and design non-
monotonic theories of belief revision that are sensitive to such philosophical
questions. “Near” monotonicity may well do for a large number of cases
([40]). In these systems knowing is all right if it usually works, or works for a
time, and modulations and corrections can be seen to update generalizations
as we go. While philosophers of language and linguists are still puzzling over
generics (“The tiger sleeps during the day”), computer scientists know that
there is no simple treatment of them, no simple “generics” operator that will
serve. Parikh’s transposition of probabilistic conditionals out of the setting
of the infinite (possible worlds semantics) and into the settings of topology
and probability allows for a rigorous approach to the idea of a generalization
that “usually” works. Usually, certain generics don’t let us down. And if we
are content with beliefs that are nearly enough right (“Birds fly”, “Humans
require contact with loved ones to thrive”, “Lydia detests pigs”), we can get
completeness of a sort, with respect to “feasible” knowledge.
A large part of Parikh’s contribution to these fields of philosophy comes
from his having brought an implementable and rigorous epistemology, logi-
cally and mathematically articulated, to bear on these disputes. It is indeed
knowing that one can know that others know such and such that permeates
our sense of our own actions’ directedness at specific outcomes: as Austin
noted in “Other Minds” ([2]), saying “I know” involves recognized proce-
dures and expectations, just as promising does. Thus epistemology must be
built for human beings, or for animals, and not for omniscient ideal beings
or Gods. The implementation of such “recognition” by mathematical and
computational means, the structuring of parametrization, is crucial to our
world of connected scientific infrastructure. But the constraints of what we
can do and use should be taken into account at the fundamental level, when
36See Quine’s [81], p. 295 and Lewis’s [46].
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the mathematics and logic are built. This is Parikh’s picture of logic and
games.
Social software is therefore an important alternative to readings of Wittgen-
stein that take him for a sceptic about how it is that in general we follow
rules—Kripke ([42]) being the most articulate defender of this sort of inter-
pretation. In the very first article Parikh published on the notion of social
software ([63]), he showed, step by step, how the programmer’s point of view
could accommodate Quine’s indeterminacy of translation ([82]), Kripke’s “no
fact of meaning” reading of Wittgenstein [42], and Searle’s Chinese Room
argument [87] in a quite ordinary and rigorous way using Dynamic Logic. A
compiler may compile correctly or incorrectly, but only relative to the whole
situation that takes into account an operating language (with decisions made
by the programmer about how to handle its syntax and conventions), and,
in the end, the purpose of the program that is writtenits standards of cor-
rectness by our lights—hence in light of social software. Typically, Parikh
argued, observers of linguistic interactions who see the behavior of their
fellows are in the same boat as an outsider attempting to scrutinize the
operational language alone, wondering what it means to say that a compila-
tion is correct or incorrect—unless and until they can “take in” the point of
the situation, the “compilations” going on by those around them, and the
purpose of the exercise.
In cases where it is di cult to say whether one is following the same
rule as another, the user end—that is, the whole social context in which we
act—decides, a point to which we shall return in §6 below.
Parikh’s analogy between the activity of a programmer and Wittgen-
stein’s idea of a language-game is not one whose point is to show that humans
are nothing but machines. Instead, it serves to question whether humans
are in a necessarily superior boat, with respect to meaning, than observers
of an operating language who are not yet in a position to judge whether or
not a program has compiled correctly. The metaphor is this: social software
is the operating system on which we write our lives, and it includes data
types at the start, although the protocols for updating alternatives in these
types depend upon numerous factors, including the particular perspectives
and interests of the participants, and are very complex. That this is an
extended analogy is no bar at all to having it play the role of a serious philo-
sophical, logico-mathematical, foundational device. In fact Parikh’s point,
like Wittgenstein’s in PI, would be to suggest that philosophical points made
by means of reflection on what we are inclined to say about language-games
often consist of no more and no less than the use of designed “objects
of comparison” (§130) to throw light on the “relations” (Verha¨ltnisse) our
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language (including what we do with it) bears to itself and to other things.37
Parikh’s relation to Frege’s notion of a proposition or thought is thus
more complicated than that suggested, also on the basis of a reading of
Wittgenstein, by Travis. Travis has insisted that Wittgenstein is capable
of fully accommodating the Fregean notion of a possible thing to be said
in a language: a thought or proposition. The twist he takes Wittgenstein
to have placed on Frege is an insistence that, on any given occasion of use,
there remains the question of which among the range of possible things to
be said that are there to be said is being said. This notion of individuation
can only happen if the speaker and audience share a sense of the point
of the conversation, the situation, the occasion of use. Travis calls this
Wittgensteinian supplement to Frege Wittgenstein’s insistence that there
must be “understandings” among us ([99]). This implies that there can, if
we vary the situation and actors and/or point of the conversation enough,
be misunderstandings. For the very same form of words may bear several
di↵erent “understandings” depending upon these (and other) factors. On
this view, the primary force of what Travis calls the “occasion sensitivity”
of propositions (and property and belief and meaning talk) is to individuate
truth values on specific occasions of saying (cf. Putnam’s [80]).
But Parikh’s analogy of social software brings in more than occasion
sensitivity and the need for “understandings”. It is intended to complicate
the logic itself, the semantics, the way and manner—structurally speaking—
in which understandings may be said to shape our sense of the point of a
given exchange.
Travis’s “brill-bream” example will serve ([97], [100] p. 106). In this
example Jones asks in the fish-shop, “Could I have brill?”, meaning her
“brill” to mean brill. The default, ceteris paribus, is that she asked for brill.
But of course there are exceptional cases: she may think that “brill” refers
to that piece of bream, having glimpsed the bream in the shop-window and
taken it for just what was recommended to her by a friend as delicious.
Then it is not so clear how we are to interpret exchanges in the shop, i.e.,
exchanges in which the language-game is played. If, confronting the piece of
fish (of what we call “bream”), she says “No, I don’t think that looks good at
all”, which of her beliefs are we to say was revised (that bream or that brill
is delicious)? If instead she says, “Thanks, I’ll take what you call ‘bream’”
37I translate “Verha¨ltnisse” as “relations”: whereas Anscombe translated it “facts [of our
language]”, Hacker and Schulte suggest “features”, i.e., “internal” grammatical relations.
I think Wittgenstein has in mind here, by contrast, the idea of treating language itself,
and we users of language, as part and parcel of the world, and in turn the world’s samples
of meaning as part of “language”.
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after the shopkeeper corrects her, explaining that this is not brill, but rather
bream, for brill is horrid tasting, whereas this bream is delicious—then what
are we to say was really revised? The thought that prompted her to enter
the shop (that brill or bream is delicious)? Her understanding of linguistic
meaning? Or of certain generalities that hold?
Travis’s point is that in order to secure a clear sense of something she
thinks (truly or falsely), understandings must be in place that give those
concepts weight. Parikh’s question—not denying this—is: How is it that we
actually spell things out in practice? Do we need to insist, for every speech
act, that there must be a precise proposition expressed, one that fits into a
total semantic space of possibility?
There are worries to be expressed here about truth, and also about be-
liefs and desires. One might reject the sense of notions Parikh has often
formalized, “almost true” or “taken by default to be true” ([1]). If one
works with such notions, then one cannot say—as some philosophers have—
that truth (in the classical semantic sense) is a constitutive element of be-
lief, but at best a regulative norm (shades here of Kant). And there will
be stress placed also, therefore—given Parikh’s approach—on certain ideas
about incentives, rationality, and desire. The analogy between truth- and
satisfaction-conditions will become more plastic, and thereby also the no-
tions of intention and agency.
However, one gain, at least in relation to certain variously contested in-
terpretations of Wittgenstein, is that the concept of social software provides
an alternative to the “social practices” explanation of meaning common to
a number of di↵erent Wittgensteinian schools.38 On the “practices explain
our ability to follow rules” view, the notions of “social” and “practice” are
taken for granted, and issues of hermeneutical, interpretive stance are taken
to be fundamental to all cases of rule-following. There are variants of the
reading: some regard the appeal to practices as explanatory, others believe
it simply evinces the irreducibility of the notion as part and parcel of our
understanding of what it is to follow a rule. The beneficial side of this
hermeneutical tradition is its emphasis on cultural and conceptual relativ-
ity, on drawing in reflection on the contingencies and alternative possibilities
for construing our intellectual and cultural practices, including whatever it
is that gets called “objective” (if anything does). The less beneficial side of
the hermeneutical and social constructivist point of view is loss of a hold on
truth and knowledge, as opposed to “correctness”, hence the temptation to
embrace a deflationary, anti-theory, end of philosophy reading of Wittgen-
38Most prominent here are Peter Winch ([113]) and Meredith Williams ([111], [112]).
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stein (such as Horwich’s). Parikh, however, is not a “deflationist”: he has
not lost hold of the notion of truth as the logician works with it, but instead
shown how it unfolds, and how knowledge and belief may be structured in
relation to it.
What Parikh has shown is that there may be a number of very di↵erent
levels of social software at work, among them of course the agent’s point
of view, but also the points of view of other agents and, especially, the
emergence of the idea of a collective space of opportunity among them. This
was perhaps less clear in some of his early papers, such as his papers on
vagueness ([56] and [58]), where his motivation for rejecting supervaluational
models, appealing to actual experiments he ran, were based on an (at that
time) fairly undi↵erentiated notion of “utility”. Then Parikh’s argument
was more Quinean and pragmatic. He expressed the point of view that
anyone who believes in structured propositions that transcend our practices
is bound to come up with a useless (from the utility point of view) framework
for analyzing such phenomena. But this left untouched a deeper point: if
“knowledge” and “utility” are taken as primitive notions, in relation to how
we actually do operate with them in real life, then how is this to be done?
Since Parikh was also a student of Putnam’s (hence aware of Putnam’s
arguments for “semantic externalism” [77], in which it is made clear that
we rely, not primarily or solely upon meanings in the head, but rather upon
a “division of linguistic labor”), he had a way to move forward with this
question. He took a pragmatic, experimental approach to vagueness and
color terms, dripping one yellow drop at a time into a red can, and query-
ing himself and others as to the point at which orange appeared. (Those
who have recently argued that philosophers face a dichotomous dilemma of
method between “experimental” and “armchair” philosophy haven’t been
reading Parikh.) In ([58]) Parikh rejected fuzzy logic as a solution, and any
kind of multi-valued logic. Instead, he said, at the cost of making the logic a
little more complicated, we could generate arguments that we can “take in”,
in the way we take in the MBTA map—and still retain a working sense of
bivalence, true and false, if we want it. And this Parikh did want to do, just
as he did in [54]. For, like Wittgenstein and Putnam, he has been thinking
through the classical notion of truth as it figured in figures such as Frege
and Russell, rather than rejecting the notion altogether in favor of a global
constructivism, verificationism, or intuitionism about meaning—at the same
time acknowledging the viability of alternative, non-classical points of view,
in virtue of the fundamental circularities and residues that must be faced,
philosophically, in foundational work at the fundamental level.
The key is that social software of this kind is connected to what we do,
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but also what we can take in. In Parikh’s recent [72] the division of linguistic
labor is adduced to disarm Kripke’s puzzle about time and thought: Parikh
reduces the paradox to a version of a simpler problem: Can I enter an empty
elevator? Yes, if all I ask is that the elevator be empty prior to my entering
it. But if I try to take into account all times at once, and approach this
top-down, I will end up demanding that the elevator be empty after I have
entered it—“and then I am going to be frustrated” (p. 124).
6. Attunements [U¨bereinstimmungen]
In contemporary epistemology, “Gettier” problems, so-called for a famous
paper (cf. [31]), are stock-in-trade. These examples derive, at least, from
Russell, who provided several important counterexamples to the ancient at-
tempt, broached (but rejected) in Plato’s Theaetetus, to analyze knowledge
as “justified true belief” (the “JTB” analysis). In considering the fundamen-
tals of epistemology Russell wrote ([83], Ch. XIII):
At first sight we might imagine that knowledge could be defined
as ‘true belief’. When what we believe is true, it might be supposed
that we had achieved a knowledge of what we believe. But this would
not accord with the way in which the word is commonly used. To
take a very trivial instance: If a man believes that the late Prime
Minister’s name began with a B, he believes what is true, since the
late Prime Minister was Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. But if
he believes that Mr. Balfour was the late Prime Minister, he will
still believe that the late Prime Minister’s last name began with a
B, yet this belief, though true, would not be thought to constitute
knowledge. If a newspaper, by an intelligent anticipation, announces
the result of a battle before any telegram giving the result has been
received, it may by good fortune announce what afterwards turns out
to be the right result, and it may produce belief in some of its less
experienced readers. But in spite of the truth of their belief, they
cannot be said to have knowledge. Thus it is clear that a true belief
is not knowledge when it is deduced from a false belief.
In like manner, a true belief cannot be called knowledge when it
is deduced by a fallacious process of reasoning . . .
At one level, the problem concerns the fact that we seem in such cases to
want to say that someone does not know a proposition even though they
meet the JTB conditions: it looks as if there are numerous Gettier coun-
terexamples to the JTB theory. More interestingly, though, are the features
Parikh and Wittgenstein 31
of our concepts of knowledge and justification that emerge through reflec-
tion on such examples. What is at issue may not only be justification and
belief, but the character of their “ordinary” environments, including the
“normality” of the participants to the occasion. Is the environment, unbe-
knownst to the believer, somehow unusual? Perhaps one is driving in “fake
barn country”, but happens to spot a real barn by accident, getting to the
right belief. Perhaps, in the fog, one dimly glimpses a sheep-shaped rock,
announces “there’s a sheep down there!”, and lo, there is one behind it.
We say one doesn’t know, but that emerges from the abnormalities of the
environment: non-accidental accidents, so to speak. And yet: are not such
“abnormalities” often very normal?
One feature of the environment is, of course, the audience and the so-
cial context in which the knowledge claim takes place. Is the audience is
complicit in the justificatory process? Perhaps the newspaper was sent a
passenger pigeon message saying the opposite of what it came to print, but
the clerk misread it, leading to the happy “prediction”. If all are satis-
fied in the end, and the newspaper’s circulation increases, are we still to be
concerned about not having fulfilled the JTB conditions? This raises the
question of how many possibilities are to be taken into account in analyzing
the notion of knowledge.39
From the point of view of social software, however, there is an even
deeper point: every claim to have analyzed or understood a knowledge claim
is itself at issue in taking an articulation for granted. The terms used in the
knowledge representation, the principles formulated, the very structure of
how the environment is conceived (as dynamic, evolving, or fixed), all matter.
Philosophy at its foundations must be, in the end, first-order. That is to
say, “explanations come to an end somewhere” (PI §1), and in particular,
they must be intersubjectively shareable, in the social light of things. There
may be no particular place at which they all end, but it is part and parcel of
our notion of justification that some group can implement an explanation,
can use it. A justification must be communicable.
As Parikh and Renero ([75]) explain, the point runs deep, a↵ecting even
the notion of a Turing machine. In Turing’s model, symbols need to be,
not merely taken in at a glance, but parsed and grasped and understood as
things to be used. So it is not just sequences of symbols and their length
that matter, but also the individuation of the symbols themselves, and that
39As Feltz ([22]) and others argue, there is evidence of cross-cultural variation and bias
documentable in speakers’ responses to Gettier and other problems in philosophy. Another
“fact” of social software, suggesting that the rise of big data sets in philosophy would be
helped by attention to Parikh’s point of view.
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within the social (perhaps even the mathematical) context in which the
program is carried out or applied.
In Plato’s Theaetetus the JTB analysis is examined at length, but in
the end rejected by Socrates as not improving upon the initial, purported
analysis of knowledge as perception. This does not imply that the notion
of perception is itself clear, and it is to be hoped that Parikh might attack
the logic of perception and at some future point (cf. (Putnam’s [79]) for an
important step in this direction). At some point, however, something must
be taken for granted. This does not mean that that point cannot itself be
called into question in turn. But not everything always can be called into
question at the same time. And there is always a point at which analysis
stops.
This, I would say, is a very important, and very traditional piece of the
notion of rigor itself (cf. my [27]). To be fully rigorous, one must admit that
at some point we must rest with something taken for granted. Moreover,
the endpoint sought after from Plato to Dedekind to Frege to Turing is
something we ought to strive to produce as commonsensical, and shared,
na¨ıve and everyday. This implies a variety of di↵erent forms of rigorization.
This brings us to another fundamental notion of Wittgenstein’s later phi-
losophy that Parikh has been developing (wittingly or not) with the notion
of social software: the notion of an attunement [U¨bereinstimmung].
Let us begin from the thought that in everyday life, our commerce and
interchange with one another, in a very everyday sense, ubiquitously involves
understandings and attunements, what Wittgenstein calls “U¨bereinstimmungen”
among us. The first thing to see is that this is a phenomenon that is to be
treated as a given. The second thing to stress is that it is very di cult to
see how it may be given.
The German word U¨bereinstimmung, as Stanley Cavell emphasized in
The Claim of Reason ([6]), may be translated as “harmony” or “attune-
ment”; examples would be choral voicings (in German, “Stimme” means
voice, as well as, through the verb, “agree” (“Das stimmt!”, “That’s right!”).
A good translation for the general notion in Wittgenstein would be “at-
tunement” or “accord”, as in pitches or tones or devices like clocks or
metronomes.
Human beings are capable, in groups, of being mutually voiced with re-
spect to their attunements ([6], p. 32). How far it is necessary for a person
to feel herself to have a voice in a discussion will depend upon the case:
some situations are cooperative, some are not, and some speakers are sit-
uated di↵erently from others— sometimes hiding certain specific pieces of
knowledge, or using infrequently used pass-phrases in unusual ways, or hold-
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ing back on information for some other reason. Yet of course “attunements”
may either be in place, or disrupted on any given occasion. They may be
displayed (or thwarted) in a performance—say, of Schubert’s quintet in C
major, to take an instrumental piece—to a greater or lesser extent, and in
one or more dimensions: emotional, expressive, with respect to the specific
notes played, the tuning of the instruments, musicality, allusions to other
performances and traditions, contrasts or similarities in emphases among
specific instruments, players, and so on. Attunement is thus a matter of
degree, and is multifarious, even if it can be pointed out as occurring on a
given occasion. As in choral singing, there may be attunement among dif-
ferent voices, and a performance may consists of many smaller ones. There
may be a “polyphonic” quality of orchestration or timed dissonance—just
as Wittgenstein orchestrates throughout the PI.40 All this implies that in
order to see “agreement” or “accord” for what it is, one needs to find the
right level of aspects, parameters, and context to draw out the protocols,
purposes, interests, and attunements, and this may not be a trivial exercise.
Of course it may be easier to see attunement in action in certain cases
rather than in others. As the opening of PI reminds us, the purchase of five
apples in a store may display certain specific attunements, though these may
be limited and partial with respect to many of the attunements we would
ordinarily say we share with our local greengrocer. In the presence of the
world wide web, the embedding of such a relatively simple transaction into
wider and wider contexts of analysis may well also be going on. Then it
is not so clear what the transaction, or the utterances of the parties to the
transaction, or we discussing them, are “really talking about”. Obviously
there is a knowledge component in such cases, but whose knowledge is at
issue matters, and just as obviously there are incentive-components, cultural
components, components of desire, of value, of expertise, social standing,
and the shared understandings and expectations of the participants. The
multiplicity of these di↵ering components suggests that without at least
some of these attunements among us, meaning and significance would be
drained from our lives. And yet it may well never be possible to survey all
the attunements that accompany our actions—even very “simple” ones.
Attunements may or may not be “agreements”, if the latter are under-
stood on the model of explicit renderings of recognized rules that are cor-
rectly applied, as in legal contexts or stipulations of parameters for specific
40See Stern’s [94] and Soulez’s ([92]) on reading the PI as a “polyphonic” text of di↵erent
voices: the interpretation is important for indicating the rationale for Wittgenstein’s later
style of writing as internal to what he has to say about our notion of logic.
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trains of reasoning. Attunements are also not reducible to evolved conven-
tion or coordination as these are frequently understood in much philosophy,
as in Lewis’s ([43]) example of two people rowing a boat, each with an oar,
or a society’s driving on the right or the left hand side of the road. This is
because several di↵erent pieces of social software may be being implemented
at once. “Attunements” should also not be reduced wholly to rationality
in the sense of the classical game theorist, as what counts as rational on
a given occasion may need to take “attunements” or the lack thereof into
account. In fact, sometimes the enunciation of an explicit agreement, e.g.,
that one will pursue classical game-theoretic rationality, may even disrupt
an “attunement” and change the game. On other occasions an implicit “at-
tunement” may generate an “agreement”, or the expected obligation that
would ordinarily accompany one.
The most fundamental point here is that the Wittgensteinian notion
of “attunement” is broader than that of “agreement”, including it, but also
relevant “disagreement” that exhibits a meaningful pattern of accord. In the
famous example in PI of the wayward pupil who follows the series +2 up to
1000, and then begins to write 1000,1004,1008,1012 (PI §§185↵), a question
arises whether the teacher could possibly have meant the order “+2” in
such a general way in enunciating it that it is determined at each step by
the teacher’s intention what we are to call an U¨bereinstimmung, a step “in
accordance with” the intended order. The pupil who adds four, as we would
say, may not be doing precisely what the teacher wanted. Nevertheless,
as we see s/he has still managed to evince a certain degree of “accord” in
error. Then, notes Wittgenstein, there might still be enough common ground
that the teacher could try to teach the student her way “as an o↵shoot or
variant” of the pupil’s, thus transforming a command into an invitation, and
an absence of attunement into an understanding (PI §143).
But not all attunements may necessarily involve understandings that are
explicit: they may only be generated in the course of a discussion. The
famed “paradox” of PI §201 is that no course of action could be deter-
mined by a rule, because every course of action can be “brought into ac-
cord with” (in U¨bereinstimmung zu bringen) the rule, so that there would
be neither contradiction nor “accord” (U¨bereinstimmung). But since there
is such accord, there cannot be an intrinsic paradox. The words “accord”
(“U¨bereinstimmung”) and rule are, writes Wittgenstein (§224), cousins, they
are aught together: we might say that the notion of “correctness” is erected
by their means.
This gives Wittgenstein the means to reply to the interlocutor who ob-
jects that he has collapsed the notions of truth and falsity into that of
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U¨bereinstimmung (§241), thus losing sight of truth and knowledge:
“So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true
and what is false?”
Wittgenstein answers:
—What is true or false is what human beings say; and it is in their
language that human beings agree (stimmen die Menschen u¨berein).
This is agreement (U¨bereinstimmung) not in opinions, but rather in
form of life.
He adds (§242) that
. . . communication by means of language requires, not only agree-
ment (U¨bereinstimmung) in definitions, but (odd as this may sound)
agreement in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not
do so.
Attunement in Wittgenstein’s sense will depend upon our sharing, roughly
speaking, a sense of what is outrageous, what is sensible, what is reason-
able, and what is what. This does not eliminate the possibility of error, it
illuminates it. Again (§345), what has to be accepted are forms of life. And
as always in Wittgenstein—early, middle and late—form is the possibility
of structure, not a description of facts that actually are. So in addition to
our actual behavior, there is the question—one for logic, not for psychology
alone—of what is possible. We illuminate what is possible for us by varying
the sorts of language-games we imagine modeling from the bottom (every-
day life) up, rather than taking a top-down approach and beginning with a
total space of possibility ahead of time.
Parikh’s work, however, goes beyond any easy metaphor of “bottom
up” or “top down”—or even “casting a sideways glance” at our impressions
of things (cf. PI §274). For he is implementing Wittgenstein’s notion of
surveyability. In the end, this means that there is no fixed stopping point or
ground for logical analysis, no ultimate simples or protocols outside of what
we (are willing to) do and use. Instead, each analysis ends where it ends,
and may be used accordingly. Each analysis erects its own terms, protocols,
schematic understandings, etc. from somewhere. But, as I have emphasized,
there is no “there” there, no final point where the metaphors are cashed in
once and for all possible times and persons and occasions and places.
Nothing could be more purely philosophical, or more ancient. Some-
where, at some point, whatever the symbols, vocabularies, and logical prin-
ciples we choose to use, we must take it that our interlocutors can “see”
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what we are getting at. We appeal to, and for, not merely perception, but
perceived attunements. We do not always find them. This does not reduce
knowledge to perception (or intuition). Instead, we must work with com-
parisons, and discuss. This is the import of PI §144, which alludes to the
ancient practice in mathematics of exhibiting a proof:
What do I mean when I say “the pupil’s ability to learn may come
to an end here”? Do I report this from my own experience? Of course
not. (Even if I have had such experience.) Then what am I doing
with that remark? After all, I’d like you to say: “Yes, it’s true, one
could imagine that too, that might happen too!”—But was I trying
to draw someone’s attention to the fact that he is able to imagine
that? —I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance
of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case
di↵erently: that is, to compare it with this sequence of pictures. I
have changed his way of looking at things. (Indian mathematicians:
“Look at this!”)
Since we have numerous subroutines and elements of logic to work with, we
can get on with discussion, understanding that our hold on our notions of
truth, knowledge, and the project of logic itself is a complicated a↵air, one
involving, ultimately, culture, history, value, and philosophy. Our prefer-
ences, acknowledgments and attunements, which are culturally and histor-
ically contingent, require, ultimately, our involvement and responsibility in
discussion and disputation with others in our community and tradition.
For Parikh, at their most general, Wittgensteinian attunements are, per-
haps among other things, implementable procedures that are recognized not
merely in the sense of the reidentification of particulars, but—just as im-
portantly and not separably—in the sense in which an authority or adminis-
tration recognizes the dominion of an individual or community over a place,
idea, or role. (In German one has erkennen and anerkennen for this, in
French savoir and reconnaˆıtre.) There are institutional factors, a system,
and there are individuals, and all of these are evolving together. The point
of Parikh’s notion of social software is to insist that recognition in this “per-
formative” sense is entangled with recognition in the sense of predication or
re-identification of a particular, and vice versa, and this throughout all of
logic and mathematics.
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